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Introduction
Additional forms of employee representation (AFER) may be defined as any
representative mechanism which exists alongside or instead of trade unions, which
historically have been the most common form of employee representation in
Australia. AFER are frequently referred to as ‘alternative forms of employee
representation’, which reflects one pattern of usage of these structures. However,
since they also may be, and commonly are, utilised as a complement to union forms of
representation, we have chosen the more neutral term ‘additional’ throughout this
paper.
It is apparent from existing research in Australia that little is known about how
additional forms of employee representation (AFER) are composed, their
independence from managerial influence, the ‘representativeness’ of such bodies, and
their accountability. In addition, little has been documented about the impact of such
structures on either the managerial objective of securing consent to organisational
change or the employee objective of influencing managerial decisions. This paper will
attempt to address these issues by examining AFER structures in Australia.
Since the early 1900s the Australian industrial relations system has been regulated
predominantly through a structure of compulsory conciliation and arbitration tribunals
producing detailed occupational or industry-based ‘awards’ to determine pay and
workplace conditions. This system deliberately privileged trade unions as employee
representatives. In this context, AFER have played a minimal role until recently, with
limited legal regulation of their structure or governance.2
However, in the last decade the system of industrial relations has been deregulated to
a considerable extent, and union membership density in Australia has declined to 28
per cent of the workforce, and even less in the private sector. Consequently,
increasing numbers of employees may not be covered by any form of representative
structure in the workplace. The demise of trade unions has left a void in terms of
'voice mechanisms' available to employees. The shift towards greater non-union
employee relations in Australia has meant that, if employees are to have a 'voice' in
the workplace, there needs to be additional institutional arrangements. These
circumstances have prompted the current interest in AFER structures.

Some Australian managers have adopted the non-union employee relations
participation models developed by companies such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM and
Proctor and Gamble. Individualism and direct communication between management
and employees are the hallmarks of these non-union firms. It is the expectation of
many managers that this 'voice' will provide suggestions and solutions to increase
productivity in the workplace. As David Packard, founder of Hewlett-Packard, has
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There are formal requirements that health and safety committees be established in unionised and nonunion workplaces. Beginning with the NSW Industrial Relations Act 1991 a number of State and
federal jurisdictions have also legislated to provide for non-union representation in negotiation of
certified enterprise agreements, but the regulations are minimal and only envisage short term
arrangements.
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argued, “If an organisation is to work effectively, the communication should be
through the most effective channel regardless of the organisation chart”.
Recent evidence from a study of non-union and lightly unionised workplaces by
Gollan and Campling (1999) suggests that satisfaction with management and
employee commitment are improved by greater participation and involvement of
employees. However, the research noted that the lack of a readily defined collective
structure in non and lightly unionised workplaces place a greater focus on
management's ability to implement change processes. This may involve a
considerable investment of management time and resources to create and develop an
organisational culture that provides a foundation for positive organisational change.
The study also reveals that there is a range of strategies and tactics being used in nonunionised workplaces to achieve desired levels of productivity and performance.
Whilst some organisations have adopted a sophisticated human resources approach
characterised by direct communication with employees and individualised reward
structures and appraisal systems linked to individual performance, others have
retained collectivist mechanisms to achieve their objectives, removing the need for a
union and providing an opportunity for companies to introduce cultural change
consistent with their corporate strategy. Some employers have a strategy of selecting
people with a negative or an ambivalent attitude towards trade unions.
Governments of all political complexions seem to have been influenced by the neoeconomic agenda, enacting legislation and promoting labour market policies that are
designed to ‘loosen’ the workplace influence of trade unions. However, no assessment
has been undertaken on the impact of such changes on employee relations, the
processes involved or the likely outcomes in an union-free environment. Some
commentators have referred to this as the ‘black hole’ of employee relations. With
declining union density a ‘representation gap’ (Freeman, Richard B. and Joel Rogers
1993, p. 14; Towers, 1997) has been created and greater focus has been placed on the
effectiveness of management initiatives in filling the void when the union has gone.
However, the argument for AFER is by no means confined to their role as an
alternative to unions. A strong argument exists for the role as a complement to union
representation for employees. Whereas unions tend to focus upon industry or
occupation-wide regulation of wages and conditions, AFER are based entirely upon
the workplace and/or enterprises levels. European experience suggests that there may
be considerable advantages for management, employees and unions in maintaining
this division of roles, especially if it allows the removal of wage determination from
the consultative process over organisational change and efficiency maximisation at
the enterprise level. In this way employers would not compete on the basis of wage
levels, thus facilitating employee commitment to the process of workplace change,
and encouraging employers to explore a greater range of efficiency options.
Furthermore, whilst AFER may benefit from union logistical support because of the
unions’ independence from management and greater resources, unions themselves
may also derive advantages from reciprocal relations with AFER through which they
can influence the entire workforce, including non-union members, at the workplace
level (see Rogers and Streeck 1995, chs. 1-3, 11; Markey and Monat 1997: 2-3, 8-12,
417-19). Survey evidence from the EU and Australia strongly indicates that all forms
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of employee participation are strengthened by union involvement (EPOC 1997: 204;
Morehead et al. 1997: ch.9).
Drawing on qualitative and quantitative evidence the paper examines recent
developments in AFER structures with a focus on six interconnected themes - their
presence, level, structure, process, agenda and outcomes. The paper first highlights
the definitional problems involved in researching AFER structures, identifies gaps in
current research, and examines the concept of industrial democracy. Secondly,
diverse models in employee participation and their interaction are examined within
current trends. Thirdly, recent evidence on organisational outcomes and AFER is
presented. Fourthly, the role of the State and the influence of legislation is examined.,
Fifthly, the conceptual issues underpinning AFER structures are assessed, focusing on
the objectives and outcomes of AFER forms. Sixthly, the environmental context is
described, highlighting the institutional framework, historical development, external
influences and legal developments in Australia. Seventhly, the way in which AFER
structures have operated in a range of organisations is examined. In particular, the
paper explores the outcomes and processes of AFER forms through survey data in
Australia. Finally, a review and conclusions are drawn from the evidence presented,
offering a synthesis of the major findings.
Definitional Problems
Significantly, the latest workplace surveys indicated an increase in both direct and
indirect forms of employee participation and involvement in Australian workplaces
(e.g. see Morehead et al. 1997: ch. 9). Direct methods of employee involvement tend
to be oriented around an employee’s tasks and focus on improving individual work
performance. Indirect involvement occurs when employees participate through
representatives at the workplace. In particular, involvement through representation
provides a mechanism for both employees and employers to express their opinions,
views, interests and concerns about the operation of the workplace and the decisionmaking processes of the organisation
Part of AFER debate has centred on the concept of industrial democracy in AFER
plans. Industrial democracy can be defined as ‘structures and institutional mechanisms
that give workers and their representatives the opportunity to influence organisational
decision-making in their places of employment’ (Hammer 1997, p. 3). However,
Hammer (1997) has questioned whether mere worker involvement or participation in
decision-making at the workplace is a sufficient condition for industrial democracy, or
whether joint decision-making or power sharing between workers and management is
necessary before democracy at the workplace can really be achieved. Moreover,
labour voice through AFER forms can differ in the scope of decisions, the amount of
power workers can exercise over management, and the organisational level at which
the decisions are made. This results in some forms being purposefully designed to
give workers a very modest role in decision-making, while others are intended to give
the workforce a substantial amount of power in organisational governance (Hammer
1997, p. 3).
The precise structure and level of the AFER can vary considerably (Gollan, 1999).
They may take the form of safety committees, works councils, consultative
councils/committees (CCs) or joint consultative committees (JCCs). In addition, the
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official terminology varies (i.e. CCs and JCCs) between jurisdictions and even among
research surveys. But in reality the variations in terminology do not equate to
differences of form or function. Importantly such structures represent all employees3
at the establishment or workplace. Some structures may have management
representation (often as chair) and involve union representatives4. Due to the
complexity of and the variations in AFER, precise definitions are problematical.
However, four elements can be identified:
•

First, only employees at the organisation can be members of the
representative body.

•

Second, there is no or only limited formal linkage to outside trade unions or
external employee representative bodies.

•

Thirdly, a degree of resources is supplied by the organisation in which the
employee representative body is based.

•

Fourthly, there is a representation of employees interests or agency function,
as opposed to more direct forms of individual participation and
involvement5.

In addition, the range of issues considered by a non-union form of representation
varies considerably, and is often dependent to some extent on its level and structure in
the organisation (i.e. ranging from workplace/work zone safety committees to
company-wide joint industrial councils - see Taras 1997).
Why research AFER?
Evaluations and generalisations about the impact of AFER are problematic, which
raises a number of questions over their structure, decision-making capacity, issues
covered and discussed and impact of outcomes. The rationale for a representative
agency function – union or non-union - in the workplace can be classified into a
number of productivity and equity functions. These include: improved communication
and information sharing; effective dispute resolution; enhanced employee bargaining
power; fair and just decision-making; and improved morale and social cohesion. The
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS 1995) indicated that
employers commonly had multiple motives for the introduction of JCCs, but
improvement of communication and improvement of workplace efficiency or
3

These structures may include union members where present.
The lack of common terminology associated with AFER structures may be caused by the lack of
prescriptive legal requirements and definitions associated with AFER structures in Australian
workplaces.
5
Other forms of direct participation may include TQM teams, self-managed work teams and quality
circles. Importantly, these forms of direct participation are not representational in nature as they are
often include every worker in the work group. Recent research from the European Works Council
Study Group has suggested that direct employee involvement is lower in organisations with formal
representative structures. This may imply that direct and indirect employee involvement are to some
extent acting as substitutes (Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998, p. 24). However, on the other
hand, the EPOC survey showed the opposite: that direct participation was enhanced in terms of
establishment and effectiveness, where representative participation was also in place (EPOC 1997:
204).
4
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productivity ranked highest, and facilitation of technological change ranked
surprisingly lowly in terms of the frequency of reasons selected (Morehead et al.
1997: 193).
Freeman and Medoff (1984) have argued, that while unions can provide an effective
method of collective employee ’voice’, there may be an incentive for employers to
provide some alternative voice mechanism where workplace union organisation is
weak or absent6. The academic literature has identified the important role of unions in
giving employees a ’voice’- enabling them to express dissatisfaction with the working
environment without fear of management retaliation. Thus, it is suggested, where
unions are weak or non-existent this voice effect will be absent, or alternatively an
employee may exercise ‘voice’ through the exit option, although Freeman and Medoff
also argue that the exit option may be a less than optimal amount of voice since
employees may be restrained or inhibited to fully express their views (Freeman and
Medoff 1984)7.
Other commentators have argued that the positive aspects of union voice are
counterbalanced by a union’s ability to extract a disproportionate share of the total
income, decreasing an organisation’s ability to raise or maintain profits, thereby
reducing the public good aspects of increased employment.
The question remains whether AFER forms may approximate ‘voice’ as identified by
traditional union structures8. Interestingly, as Freeman and Medoff noted, the efficacy
of voice depends on the way in which labour and management interact, rather than
whether unions exist or not (Sako 1998; Freeman and Medoff 1984). As such,
commentators have argued that from a social perspective the role of AFER as
bargaining agents (thus similar to traditional trade union forms) may be desirable for
power equality or ethical industrial democracy reasons, where unions do not exist.
Advocates state that this can only be achieved by legal enactment, for example
mandated works councils, because employers will be reluctant to introduce bodies
which challenge managerial prerogative and potentially reduce profit due to the
additional costs involved.
However, this proposition is dependent on the wider institutional context.
Organisations may create such bodies for the purposes of bargaining to reduce the
likelihood of outside involvement by trade unions in organisational decision-making,
thus ensuring that bargaining processes are contained within the organisation. This
6

This view has been challenged because for many employers it is not important whether AFER
structures can approximate unions as part of the collective bargaining process, since this may not be the
objective or desired outcome.
7
However, his may also be inefficient for both employers and employees. Employers may have cost
associated with the loss of experienced workers and added job replacement, and employees face costs
associated with finding alternative work and loss of service based benefits.
8
This statement presupposes that voice provided by unions is an improvement over the non-union
option. Some commentators have questioned such an assumption, arguing that union-based collective
bargaining may have negative aspects, even from a general social and organisational point of view. It is
often suggested that union leaders, who represent the union’s voice to the firm, may have different
agendas than the membership and thus the voice stated may not actually reflect the members’ own
interests, or accurately represent the views of the leadership. However, studies in the U.K. have
suggested that legal procedural requirements of voting and the strict processes of balloting legislation
have legitimised leadership opinions and action, with membership in some unions deplacing leadership
on the basis on their moderate and accommodating views (Kelly and Heery 1994).
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may be due to the perception that outside influence may distort internal processes and
structures, impacting negatively on employee behaviour and organisational
performance.
Others have argued that structures representing the interests of employees through
collective bargaining (legally enforced or not) may give more legitimacy and efficacy
to the decision-making process (Hyman 1997), ensuring greater organisational
commitment. Some advocates suggest firms voluntarily introduce AFER structures,
reflecting the culture and norms of a particular workplace. This approach is based on
the assumption that by establishing and maintaining effective working employee and
employer relationships, employees’ rights will be recognised and respected,
encouraging an alignment of interests and promoting mutual respect and
responsibility (Walton 1985). This suggests that unions and AFER can play
complementary roles.
Models of diversity and interaction9
An important question is to what extent non-union workplaces allow for an employee
voice mechanism in the workplace? An analysis by Gollan and Campling (1999)
indicates that around half of managers in non-union workplaces and about a third of
managers in lightly unionised workplaces negotiated workplace change directly with
employees. AWIRS 1995 indicated a much lower 15 per cent of non-union
workplaces negotiated with groups of employees over workplace matters, although in
unionised workplaces the figure rose to 28 per cent (Morehead et al. 1997: 196).
Whether these negotiations constitute genuine employee involvement or ‘voice’
depends on the degree to which the processes adopted allow employees to be
genuinely 'heard' and to influence the change process.
Studies have shown that employees have taken on increased responsibility at work,
but that this has not resulted in a greater willingness by employers to trust or give
employees more participation and involvement in organisational decision-making
processes. Other findings suggest that negotiations in non-unionised workplaces are
less likely than negotiations in highly unionised workplaces to make use of collective
structures but more likely to involve 'employees acting on their own behalf’. That is,
negotiations in non-unionised environments appear to make less use of formalised
consultative mechanisms and more use of informal methods of communicating
employee concerns to management. Yet, unionised workplaces in AWIRS 1995 were
also more likely to generate individual negotiations and non-union negotiations with
groups of employees, as well as union negotiations (e.g. Morehead et al. 1997: 19394, 196). This suggests that unionisation is associated with an extension of employee
voice in all forms.

9

For more detail of this debate see ‘Conclusions: Models of diversity and interaction’ by Paul Gollan
and Raymond Markey (2001) in Markey, R, Chouraqui, A., Gollan, P., Hodgkinson, A. and Veersma,
U. (eds), Models of Employee Participation in a Changing Global Environment: Diversity and
Interaction.
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As one senior manager of large communications company stated in the Gollan and
Campling (1999:37) study, ’If you accreditate your communication on the basis that
all managers should be communicating to all staff, what we don’t want is to
inadvertently exclude people from that communications process. As far as we are
concerned representation-type structures do exclude people. It is naive to think the
person that is so-called representing the group is going to be representing everyone in
the group because by definition not everyone is going to have the same opinion’.
However, this would indicate that employee involvement in the non-union workplace
is often structured in a way that minimises the ability of employees to exert a
significant influence on organisational decision-making and broader managerial
decisions regarding the introduction of change. That is, employee 'voice' in nonunionised organisations tends not to function as an exact equivalent of employee
'voice' in unionised companies. AWIRS 1995 reported that whereas 63 per cent of
employers consulted employees who were affected by organisational change in formal
meetings, only 13 per cent indicated that the changes were negotiated with union
representatives and dependent upon their agreement (Morehead et al. 1997: 244-46).
But therein lies a note of caution for employers - this does not mean that employees in
non-unionised workplaces have no impact on the introduction of change. According
to AWIRS 1995, some 13 per cent of managers in non-union workplaces indicated
that employees directly affected by change were either resistant or strongly resistant
to such change (Morehead et al. 1997: 545). In addition, AWIRS 1995 reported that
21 per cent of managers in unionised workplaces and 15 per cent of managers in all
workplaces stated employee and/or union resistance was a barrier to change
(Morehead et al. 1997: 255-56). On the other hand, an Illawarra version of the
AWIRS 1995 indicated a close correlation between organisational change and
unionisation (Hodgkinson 2001). These mixed trends suggest that management
should use a wide range of forme of employee participation to effectively facilitate
organisational change, rather than rely on one particular form over another.
The case studies from the Gollan and Campling (1999) study reveal that management
uses a variety of ways to communicate with their employees. Nearly all the cases in
the study had weekly and/or monthly newsletters and magazines. Half of the
organisations used consultative committees or focus groups as a form of
communication. Similar patterns of the multiplicity of forms of communication were
evident in AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al. 1997: ch. 9).
Management in those organisations that did not have a consultative committee
structure in the Gollan and Campling (1999) study, believed that it was counterproductive as all managers should be communicating to all staff and not excluding
people from the communications process. Central to this is the emphasis on individual
communication with employees and a deep suspicion and disinclination towards any
forms of collective consultation. These firms tend to be concentrated in the high
technology sectors, such as electronics, computing and telecommunications, and in
'greenfield' sites or new companies. For example, a commercial television
broadcasting company has developed a variety of communication techniques,
including internal television to deliver occasional addresses, e-mail and monthly
newsletters in an attempt to build a 'consultative enterprise'. This contrasts with a
construction company, which established a highly developed employee committee
structure, acting as a forum for setting goals, measuring performance and addressing a
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wide range of workplace issues including quality control and training. The
effectiveness of the process became evident from a company questionnaire, which
revealed that most employees believed the JCC provided a ’voice’ for their opinions
and concerns.
AFER and organisational outcomes
Since, in the Australian context, such structures are initiated by management in a
majority of cases (54 per cent by management initiative, but 24 per cent as a result of
agreements, and only 1 per cent because of union initiative, Morehead et al. 1997:
193), is it worth the effort and resources? This is predicated on the idea that allowing
workers a ’voice’ provides a mechanism for the early detection of problems and for
their participation in decisions that could have a potentially positive impact on
productivity and quality.
Fernie and Metcalf’s (1995) analysis in the UK of the 1990 Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey (WIRS3) suggests that where JCCs exist voluntarily, ‘there is not a
single unfavourable association between the presence of a JCC and workplace
performance’ (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995:397-398). Moreover, they argue that there are
weak favourable associations between the existence of a JCC and both increased
productivity and a positive employee relations climate. They state that the
consultation process implied by the existence of the JCC makes it easier to change
working practices and introduce new technology, leading to faster productivity growth
both in unionised and non-union workplaces (Fernie and Metcalf 1995, p. 397).
Additional research in Britain and the United States (U.S.) also suggests that the
adoption of a cluster of ‘best practice’ HR practices, which includes some level of
indirect employee participation, can increase the stock market value of organisations
by around 15 per cent (Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998, p. 9). Fernie and
Metcalf (1995) cite Denny and Nickell’s (1991) research, which shows that
investment rates10 are higher in both union and non-union workplaces with a JCC.
Fernie and Metcalf also suggest that there are ‘favourable associations between the
existence of a JCC and both productivity growth and the climate of employeemanagement relations’ (Fernie and Metcalf 1995, p. 397). They conclude that the
provision of information and consultation appears to lead to more harmonious
relations between employees and management than is the case where there is no JCC
(Fernie and Metcalf 1995, p. 397).
In addition, recent research into the European car components industry has suggested
that there is positive business performance for those companies adopting more
participative employee practices (including representative participation). This has
included improvements in quality, communication and the quality of decision-making
(Sako 1998). In Australia AWIRS 1995 data also suggest that JCCs have a significant
impact on workplace performance and communications between management and
employees, as well as encouraging change at the workplace (Morehead et al. 1997, p.
511). Since AWIRS 1995 found that these were two of the main objectives of
management in introducing JCCs, this indicates a high degree of achievement of
objectives in forming them (Morehead et al. 1997: 192-95 ).
10

Such as the level of financial investment in technology or training.
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Another study cited in research from the European Works Council Study Group into
employee involvement within European multinationals by Addison, Siebert, Wagner
and Wei examined the relationship between unionisation and the impact of
consultative committees in the UK. Their findings suggested that consultative
committees in unionised workplaces were associated with slightly lower productivity,
whereas in non-union workplaces they were associated with higher productivity
(Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998, p. 8). It was suggested that this
conclusion was based on a tendency for committees in union workplaces to consult on
minor or ‘inappropriate’ issues (Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998, p. 8). It
could also be that unions in such workplaces wish to remain the predominant source
of representation over substantive issues and view such committees as talking forums
only. In addition, it could be argued that conflicting voice mechanisms may in fact
generate conflict, although these findings are contrary to AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et
al. 1997) and EPOC (1997) data.
Analysis by Guest and Peccei (1998) of partnership and performance in the UK
indicates that high levels of direct and representative participation, especially
representative participation in policy decisions, have a significantly positive impact on
employee commitment to the organisation and the positive state of the psychological
contract between employees and employers. In other words, there was a consistent
finding that high levels of employee influence have a positive impact on employee
attitudes and behaviour (Guest and Peccei 1998, pp. 36-38).
In addition, evidence from the Australian Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA)
regarding consultative processes leading to individual agreements, or Australian
Workplace Agreements (AWAs), suggests that productive outcomes from more
collective forms of employee involvement. A recent Office of Employment Advocate
Report reviewing evidence from 688 organisations with approved AWAs
stated,‘Contrary to management perceptions over the effectiveness of the various
methods of communicating information about AWAs, initial results would suggest
that more collective participation mechanisms may yield greater organisational
outcomes ... employers who made use of JCCs or works committees were
significantly more likely to have had an improvement in labour productivity.’ (Gollan,
2000: 23).
More specifically, the report also suggested that the improvement in management and
employee relations outcomes were associated with the use of JCCs (or works
committees) and elected non-union representatives. The ability to implement change
was also considered to be influenced by JCCs (or works committees), and lower
employee turnover may also be influenced by the use of JCCs or works committees,
and the use of task forces (Gollan, 2000:23).
The reports concludes by stating that ‘... while regular formal meetings between
managers and employees, and individual employee discussions are the most
frequently used channels of communication ...when supplemented with other forms of
communication they were even more likely to achieve greater improvement in a range
of organisation outcomes’ (Gollan, 2000:25). This confirms findings in the EU
(EPOC 1997).
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The role of the state
Another dimension in the debate is that of state imposed, in contrast to privately
sponsored AFER structures. In many continental European countries, AFER take the
form of works councils elected by all employees, and sanctioned by law. These
enjoy statutory co-decision rights on certain issues as well as rights to information and
consultation. They function within a broader framework of organisational resources,
shaping the process of consultation. In the German and Dutch (‘Rhineland’) model of
a dual structure of interest representation for employees, the separate jurisdictions of
works councils to deal with domestic labour relations in the enterprise and unions
involved in industry or regional level collective bargaining are strictly maintained by
law. In the mainly English speaking countries such as Australia, JCCs exist on the
voluntary basis of agreement with unions, or by unilateral instigation of management
(Markey and Monat 1997: 412-14).
Hammer (1997) has suggested that in the absence of legislation that legitimises
AFER, the effectiveness of such programs is dependent on ‘the good will, trust, and
power relationship between the parties. She argues, ‘trust is a brittle property of any
relationship, easily broken and difficult to rebuild’ (Hammer 1997, p. 9). Or in other
words, such a relationship based on pure voluntarism is inherently insecure. To
reinforce this point, research suggests that trust in the outcomes of non-union
participation structures can be substantial when employees have their group interests
protected by general worker rights legislation (Hammer 1997; Hammer, Ingebrigtsen,
Karlsen, and Svarva 1994 as cited in Hammer 1997). As Hammer argues, company
specific idiosyncratic representational forms work very well as long as workers
believe that the general legislation is sufficient to deter the management from making
decisions that can hurt worker interests (Hammer 1997, p. 10).
Recent research into employee involvement within European multinationals by the
European Works Council Study Group has suggested that ‘the principal impact of
legislation mandating employee involvement practices is on the channel used to
inform and consult employees i.e. via trade union, representative committee or
directly with employees’ (Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998, p. 3).
Moreover, the study also concludes that where limited law and regulation is applied
on employee involvement, such as in the U.K., there is a greater diversity of employee
involvement than in countries where employee involvement practices are required by
law (Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998, p. 3).
In the Australian context McCallum has added to the debate in Australia by
suggesting that, ‘if the law does not mandate elected works councils, the coverage and
importance of collective labour law will shrink. I venture to think that it is no longer
possible for the trade unions to remain the sole repository of collective employee
representation in our nation (McCallum 1997, p. 7).
Conceptual issues
The question arises whether management will choose to put in place additional
structures to allow more effective communication of employee grievances and
concerns or to encourage greater employee involvement as a substitute for traditional
forms of collective representation through trade unions. Or alternatively, will
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management introduce alternative structures as a complement to management
structures? The objective of this would be to foster an alignment of employee and
employer interests in the workplace.
The debate can be classified into two approaches: first, AFER structures are an
inherent win-lose or zero sum game. This is based on the premise that an individual
employee is inherently at a disadvantage in the employment relationship due to the
monopoly power of the employer. Alternatively, AFER structures can be viewed as an
instrument through which both sides realise a ‘win-win’ outcome in the employment
relationship or positive sum game perspective, highlighting common interest between
employers and employees other promoting a unitarist approached based on shared
beliefs and goals, or pluralist ‘mutual gains’ approach based on cooperative system of
employment relations11. This debate has centred on AFER as communication devices
or mechanisms for employee involvement, whether they are a ‘complement’ to
management decision-making or as some commentators have suggested, a ‘substitute’
for unions through the collective bargaining process (See Gollan, 1999).
One notion of a ‘substitute’ is that it serves in place of a union, which presupposes a
win-lose employment relationship from an employer’s view.12 It assumes employers
create an AFER which employees will prefer to ‘union’ forms of representation. An
entirely different notion is that AFER make traditional union structures unnecessary,
in the sense that they transform the employment relationship, with other high
commitment practices, into a win-win relationship. This notion is based on the
premise that employees do not desire or need a protective agency through traditional
bargaining per se (since this emphasises the adversarial, distributive element of the
employment relationship) because their basic interests are satisfied. In this approach
the purpose of AFERs is to encourage and foster an alignment of interests between
employer and employees.
Conceptually, the terms ‘substitute’ or ‘union avoidance’ suggest twin strategies: first,
excluding a union by establishing an AFER structure to take its place; second,
transforming the employment relationship from a traditional adversial approach based
on conflictual interest of ‘win-lose’ to a ‘win-win’ or mutual gains approach with an
alignment of interest, undermining the very reason for a union (Gollan, 1999). This
strategy can be described as high commitment management (HCM) (Walton 1985;
Guest 1995; Storey 1992; Wood 1996).
An alternative strategy is evident when traditional trade union structures and AFER
‘complement’ each other, dovetailing in terms of form and function, as in the case of
German works councils in the plant level co-determination process alongside
industry-wide trade union bargaining. The former is focused on generating substantive
and procedural norms through plant-level agreements, while the latter establishes
11

This perspective is encapsulated by human resource management (HRM) theorists advocating high
commitment work practices and emphasising mutual gains in the enterprise (Kochan, Katz, and
McKersie 1986; Walton 1985).
12
However, unions often claim that both sides can be better off in such a relationship through increased
voice benefits and through the union ‘shock’ effect of higher wages. In this situation firms focus on
productivity rather than costs. In addition, advocates of the social partnership model (such as John
Monks in the UK – General Secretary of the TUC) would strongly disagree that union presence
presupposes a ‘win-lose’ relationship.
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general conditions of employment and salary and wage levels. This dual system is
defined and circumscribed by extensive juridification and legal process (Koch 1995,
p. 146). Some commentators have highlighted the appropriateness of this separation
of jurisdictions, with workplace issues being discussed by AFER and industry issues
being discussed by trade unions, linking structure with the scope of issues. There are
two approaches: one based on a European works council model with rights
established by law, such as the right to information, the right of consultation in
economic and financial matters, and the right of consent in social and personnel
affairs. The second approach is through JCCs or labour-management committees
more common in the mainly English speaking countries, which have more openended mandates to deal with issues of common interest to workers and management.
They are rarely regulated by law and their power and role are more limited than these
of works councils in the decision-making process.
These strategies seem to be confirmed in research by the European Works Council
Study Group which identified significant differences between the UK and other
European countries in the issues covered by employee involvement and representative
practices. U.K. consultation issues focused on productivity and competitiveness while
in other countries such as Germany, greater focus was placed on joint decisionmaking and negotiation, such as collective redundancies (Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood
and Callerot 1998, p. 3). Parsons has recently stated, it is not the existence of a
particular employee participation structure, but the objectives, strategies and choices
within which it operates (Parsons 1997, p. 32).
Environmental context
To understand the role of AFER plans various dimensions of the environmental
context of the Australian industrial relations system need to be considered. This
section will examine the institutional context and historical evolution, the external
factors influencing and legal developments underlying AFER forms in Australia.
Development of AFER
Australia's industrial relations system throughout this century has been strongly
influenced by the centralised tribunal-based systems of compulsory State conciliation
and arbitration. Arbitration systems in one form or another exist at federal level and in
all six States of Australia13. Respective federal and State Acts of Parliament provide
for the establishment of conciliation and arbitration tribunals, the registration and
legal recognition of employer and employee associations (unions14), and detail the
rights and obligations of the parties subject to some legislative limitations. The
tribunals are empowered to handle industrial disputes and to set wages and conditions
of employment embodied in awards.
13

In Victoria the AIRC exercises limited arbitral powers with respect to most Victorian employees: see
Part XV of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The Independent Report of the Victorian Industrial
Relations Taskforce recommends the reestablishment of a limited form of State IR Tribunal for
Victorian employees.
14
In Australia the legal regulation of trade unions is essential to arbitration and conciliation and confers
corporate status protection against discrimination, and security and protection against competing unions
covering the same industry or occupation. The AIRC also needs to be satisfied that ‘the association is
free from control by or improper influence from, an employer, or an association or organisation of
employers’ (Workplace Relations Act 1996 s189 (aa)).
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Historically, employer and employee associations together with the industrial
tribunals have dominated the wage setting and dispute-resolution processes.
Employees have only been able to access this system through being represented by
trade unions. Although union density has declined dramatically in recent years,
workplace relations involving non-unionised establishments have also been
dominated by the centralised system, as awards cover union and non-union employees
alike, accounting for about 90 per cent of the workforce. In the State systems, which
have jurisdiction over a significant proportion of the total national workforce,
common rules extend award coverage to all employees in a given occupation or
industry. Furthermore, until the 1980s tribunals, supported by the courts, traditionally
treated managerial prerogative as sacrosanct in areas outside a narrow perception of
‘industrial issues’ (essentially wages and hours). Issues such as technological and
organisational change and issues associated with it, training, and the structure of the
workforce, all of which would be the subject of consultation (and even codetermination) in European works councils, were thus effectively excluded from the
jurisdiction of the Australian industrial relations system until the mid-1980s (see
Markey 1987).
As Markey and Reglar (1997) state, employee participation or industrial democracy
has been slow to gain acceptance in Australian industry. They argue that ‘Australian
managers have traditionally been wary of any whittling away at their managerial
prerogative … Unions were also traditionally suspicious of employee participation
schemes as a management plot. For its part, the national level of government had
lacked the will or the constitutional authority to implement a widespread system of
industry democracy’ (Markey and Reglar 1997, p. 358).
During the 1980s a dramatic twofold shift occurred in the Australian system. First,
tribunals (supported by the High Court) broadened the scope of issues considered to
be suitable for consultation from the early 1980s (Markey 1987). Secondly, from the
mid-1980s a major trend towards decentralised arrangements has emerged under wage
fixing principles determined by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission
(AIRC). As part of this process, the AIRC required enterprises to establish appropriate
mechanisms for consultation and negotiation on matters affecting the organisation’s
efficiency and productivity, when it adopted the ‘structural efficiency principle’
relating to award restructuring in 1988 (Dabscheck 1995: 30-33, 51-63). The spread
of JCCs in Australian firms date from that time. However, it was not until the
Keating government introduced further reforms to extend enterprise bargaining in to
the non-union sector under the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, that AFER
became a widespread national topic of discussion and debate, although there had been
a precursor in the 1991 NSW Act (Morehead et al. 1997: 188-89). The 1993 federal
legislation gave a renewed focus to non-union workplace relations, in particular the
nature and extent of workplace decision-making outside the centralised industrial
relations framework, including the influence and role of non-union forms of employee
representation. The non-union agreements (or Enterprise Flexibility Agreements) then
catered for were collective in nature and required a high degree of consultation
between employees and management in making the agreement.
In 1997, a new phase of industrial relations reform began with the introduction of the
Commonwealth Workplace Relations Act 1996, which repealed and replaced the
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previous federal industrial relations legislation. The new legislation enabled
employers to enter into either a non-union collective agreement or non-union
individual contracts with their employees, known as Australian Workplace
Agreements (AWAs). While these agreements are individually signed, an employer or
employee may appoint a person to be his or her bargaining agent in relation to the
making, approval, variation or termination of the AWA (CCH 1998, p. 11),
potentially giving AFER a role in negotiating AWAs.
External influences
Australian industry has long had a high proportion of multinationals amongst its
firms, especially from the UK and US. More recently corporations from Japan and
other Asia-Pacific based firms have set-up workplaces in Australia. However, the
influence of overseas firms on the Australian industrial relations environment has
appears to have been limited, largely due to the strong influence and role of tribunals
and prescriptive industrial relations legislation (see discussion above).
The centralised industrial relations system has reduced the effect of American-style
non-union HRM approaches to employee representation. While ad hoc developments
have occurred in a few multinational organisations no predominant form of AFER has
developed in Australia. However, more recently certain US multinationals have
sought to apply non-union approaches to the Australian context with varying degrees
of success (see the case study discussion of The Toys Company below). It has been
suggested that recent changes to federal industrial relations legislation have increased
the potential for the introduction of more HRM and ‘mutual gains’ approaches in the
future. Australia’s exposure to such outside influences provides a potential mix and
diversity of industrial relations structures, creating a fertile ground for the
development of AFER forms in the future (Gollan, Pickersgill and Sullivan 1996, p.
36).
Legal developments
Australia has not had national or State legislation to support the development of works
councils or any other form of AFER structures along the lines which have been
established in many European countries (Gardner and Palmer 1997, p. 344). Legally,
one of the relatively few examples of institutionalised employee participation in
management decision-making processes has been the establishment of safety and
health committees in organisations with a certain number of employees determined by
State occupational health and safety statutes15.
In some Australian States, such as New South Wales, some experimentation of AFER
structures has occurred. In the 1991 Industrial Relations Act (NSW) provisions
allowing ‘works committees’ were introduced to facilitate State-based enterprise
bargaining. Under s119 of the 1991 Act, enterprise agreements could be made
between an enterprise employer and a works committee to represent persons
employed in the enterprise. The Act stated that before a works committee could
become a party to an enterprise agreement, the proposed agreement must have been
15

See, e.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW) ss 23-25; and Occupational Health and
Safety Act 1985 (Vic) 37.
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approved in a secret ballot by not less than 65 per cent of employees in the enterprise.
Their role was to represent persons employed at the establishment in negotiating,
making, varying and terminating of enterprise agreements.16
Nationally, new consultation requirements were introduced in 1993 as part of the
Commonwealth Industrial Relations Reform Act (the Reform Act). In particular the
provisions relating to non-union agreements or ‘EFAs’ stated that for an agreement to
be approved it was necessary that during the negotiations ‘reasonable steps’ had been
taken to ‘consult’ and ‘inform’ employees about the agreement and its terms. In
addition these terms needed to be ‘explained’ and employees ‘advised’ before the
agreement was approved (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen 1997, p. 203).
However, these provisions did not prescribe the means (structure or processes)
through which such consultation was to occur (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen
1997, p. 203). The provisions stated that as a precondition to approval, the agreement
should establish a process for the parties ‘to consult each other about matters
involving changes to the organisation or performance of work in any place of work to
which the agreement relates’ unless ‘the parties have agreed that it is not appropriate
for the agreement to provide’ such a process.17 Importantly, the Act only required the
establishment of a ‘process’ rather than a ‘mechanism’ or ‘structure’, and therefore
did not necessarily envisage a permanent representative body18. Nor did the
legislation state how employees were to be represented in this process.
Whatever possibility the legislation created for AFER forms, the recent Workplace
Relations Act 1996 limited this potential. The requirements in the new legislation are
limited to ensuring employee ‘access’ to the agreements (up to fourteen days prior to
approval), and that the employer took reasonable steps to explain the agreement to
employees (PartVIB s170LR (2)(a)(b)). Importantly, the legislation did not prescribe
a structure or body for consultation.
Survey evidence
The Australian federal government’s Green Paper Industrial Democracy and
Employee Participation published in 1986 found ‘little evidence of the widespread
application of employee participation and only a few examples of genuine worker
influence on major decision-making’ in Australian workplaces both in unionised and
non-union environments (1986, p. 65). However, Marchington’s analysis of the
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS)19 data reveals a growth in
the number of formal joint consultative mechanisms in the latter part of the 1980s, and
that generally they were perceived by management to be quite successful
(Marchington 1992, p. 530; Morehead et al. 1997: 194-94).

16

The purpose of an enterprise agreement is to regulate (wholly or partly) the conditions of
employment of employees in a single enterprise.
17
No equivalent provisions to section 170NC(1)(f) appear in the recently enacted Workplace Relations
Act.
18
Nor did the Act require make any reference to the frequency and make-up of this ‘process’ (Mitchell,
Naughton and Sorensen 1997, p. 204).
19
A national survey in 1990 covering more than 2,000 workplaces and 19,000 employees.
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However, while a large proportion of Australian workplaces reported the existence of
various types of employee involvement schemes, there were relatively few cases
where involvement took the form of representative participation with a genuine
opportunity to influence decision-making at work. It was found that JCCs existed in
only 14 per cent of workplaces, although such arrangements covered 30 per cent of
Australian employees (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen 1997, p. 200; Callus,
Morehead, Cully and Buchanan 1991). As in the U.K., an analysis of unpublished
data from AWIRS suggested that AFER structures were most common in unionised
workplaces (Campling and Gollan 1999).
The release of the latest AWIRS 1995 data indicates an increasing trend towards
AFER plans. The 1995 incidence of JCCs was more than double that of 1990,
increasing from 14 to 33 per cent of workplaces. The increase for more temporary,
specific purpose task forces or ad hoc committees was also substantial, up from 25 to
38 per cent (Morehead et al. 1997, p. 188). Morehead et al. (1997) state that much of
this increase may have come about because of legislative requirements relating to
enterprise bargaining or making organisational change initiatives as smooth as
possible (Morehead et al. 1997, pp.189-190).
Judging from this survey evidence two qualifications should be made regarding the
non-union environment. First, the data indicates that the most common impetus for
the introduction of AFER plans was management at the workplace. Second, as
suggested in the previous AWIRS data and UK evidence, AFER forms are more
likely to occur at unionised workplaces (48 per cent), particularly those with an active
union presence, compared to workplaces with no union (13 per cent)(Morehead et al.
1997, pp.193-4).
This trend was confirmed by research into employee participation of non-union EFAs
by Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen (1997)20, which revealed that despite additional
legislative requirements for consultation in EFAs under the Industrial Relations
Reform Act 1993 (the Reform Act), there was a poor outcome with only 59 per cent of
EFAs containing AFER such as consultative committees (CCs)21 (Mitchell, Naughton
and Sorensen 1997, p. 205). In a further analysis, 64 per cent of EFAs which included
CCs did not indicate a fixed number of meetings and in 56 per cent of EFAs there was
no reference to meetings at all (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen 1997, p. 211). In
addition, few EFAs which had established AFER plans, indicated how committees
were to be appointed, or stated the committee’s jurisdiction (Mitchell, Naughton and
Sorensen 1997, p. 213). All this indicates limited effectiveness.
In the non-union sector recent research undertaken in Australia by Campling and
Gollan (1999) reveals that there is little incentive for most non-union workplaces to
establish any NER structure due to the traditionally centralised nature of Australian
industrial relations (see previous discussion on history and legal structures). It can be
argued that this is not a failure of NER per se, as bargaining is not the main purpose
of these representative forms. However, further research by Campling and Gollan
(1999) suggests that even where there have been collective agreements, these have
20

All EFAs approved by the AIRC between 1 April 1994 and 6 September 1995 (109 agreements in
total)
21
This calls into question the effectiveness of the legislation, which requires a process but does not
state the ‘mechanism’ or ‘structure’ by which this should take place.
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been made without any genuine bargaining or consultation with employees. In
addition, management was usually the party that determined whether a more
collective relationship was established (Campling and Gollan 1999).
Additional case study research into JCCs as part of the enterprise bargaining process
suggested that many of the committees are limited by management to trivial issues or
what McGraw and Palmer term the three T’s – Tea, Towels and Toilets (McGraw and
Palmer 1994). They argue that many AFER forms have a short life with many issues
left unresolved due to limited provision of resources to implement recommendations
and inadequate training to facilitate effective participation (McGraw and Palmer 1994,
pp. 98-101).
Review and discussion
The evidence suggests that there are a range of strategies and tactics being utilised in
lightly and non-unionised workplaces to achieve desired levels of productivity and
performance. Whilst some organisations have adopted a human resources approach,
characterised by direct communication with employees and individualised reward
structures, others have retained collectivist mechanisms to achieve their objectives.
Overall, the available evidence suggests that where organisations have greater
employee participation and involvement, it has been good for business in terms of
improved performance and productivity. Furthermore, the evidence also suggests that
the lack of employee involvement, especially representative participation or legitimate
worker ‘voice’, could help to explain low levels of commitment among workers.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the new co-operative tendencies do not eliminate
the adversarial element in organisations, but channel it instead. The pattern of tensions
can be shifted due to changing expectations of employees and the interpretation of
these expectations by their representatives. These dangers are apparent for companies
in actively seeking a more direct approach. In a Consultancy Group company in the
Campling and Gollan (1999) study, the Executive Chairman wanted to avoid the
bureaucratic and indirect communication structures that he had been accustomed to as
a senior manager in a large Australian commercial bank. Management communication
and special activities had a distinctly individual focus rather than a collective group
orientation.
However, the consultation process was challenged by the morale problems among
both office and professional staff. According to a senior manager, the morale
problems resulted from the lack of promotional opportunities and the absence of team
building culture required in a project based industry due to a highly individualised and
often discretionary approach to employee relations in the company. This direct
management-employee communication style resulted in outcomes which were
frequently concealed from other employees (eg salary levels, magnitude of bonus
payments, training), rather than open collective dialogue with staff where differences
could have been acknowledged and discussed and solutions found. As a result there
has been growing employee and management support for more formalised policies,
increased openness, and human resources practices based on equitable and more
collective processes, especially in relation to remuneration decisions. Even News
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International in the UK has recognised the benefits of collective representative
structures by establishing a staff association with negotiation and bargaining rights.
Conclusion
In recent years lower trade union presence has led to the development of a
‘representation gap’ in many organisations. As a consequence there has been
considerable discussion in the literature on the effectiveness of AFER structures as
communication devices and mechanisms for employee involvement, or as some
commentators have suggested, as a substitute for unions in the collective bargaining
process. The underlying debate centres on whether AFER make trade unions
unnecessary, or whether AFER have a different but complementary role to that of
unions at the workplace.
To examine these two approaches the research has addressed a number of questions.
First, can AFER act as substitutes for trade unions? Drawing on qualitative and
quantitative evidence this paper presents the case that AFER in Australia have been
essentially ineffective as substitutes for union representation, due to the very limited
role AFER structures play in the bargaining process. This has restricted the ability of
AFER to represent employees’ interests in the areas of pay and conditions. The
evidence also reveals that employee involvement in non-union workplaces was often
structured in a way that minimised the ability of employees to have a significant
influence on how and in what form change was introduced.
Therefore, what role do AFER have and how effective have they been? The evidence
suggests that AFER can be very effective in developing greater overall workplace
consultation and involvement of employees. In particular, the evidence indicates that
in organisations where greater employee participation has been introduced (especially
indirect representative participation), it has been good for business in terms of
improved performance and productivity. In addition, it has been suggested that, while
the influence of AFER structures over policy and strategic issues is limited, where
they have influence over such issues, greater organisational outcomes have resulted
with higher employee commitment and more positive employee attitudes and
behaviour towards the organisation.
Moreover, the cases examined in this paper indicate increasing adoption of innovative
AFER structures as part of sophisticated HRM approaches, which emphasise
communication and consultation. However, further analysis questions the longevity of
these innovative AFER in Australian workplaces. Evidence suggests that traditional
adversial industrial relations re-emerged when raised worker expectations were not
met because AFER failed to deliver the desired outcomes, resulting in low morale and
dissatisfaction.
The preceding review would suggest that it is not the formal existence of AFER
which is associated with greater effectiveness and positive performance outcomes.
Rather, the nature of the relationship, management style and culture, and trust
developed in AFER structures, and the degree to which influence over managerial
decisions is ceded through such forums, are the most important factors (FentonO’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998, p. 27). The evidence demonstrates that, only by
establishing mechanisms that allow employees to have legitimate voice and allow

19

differences to emerge will managers be able to channel such differences into more
productive outcomes. The clear message from the research is that high quality
communication and consultation between management and employees at the
workplace is essential for achieving performance and employee commitment.
The evidence raises a number of other important points. First, generally these AFER
structures have limited access to resources (eg training) for establishing independence,
thus reducing their ability to effectively evaluate the issues discussed at meetings and
represent the views of employees. Second, most AFER bodies are structured on a
mixed basis of employee elected representatives and appointed management
delegates, with the latter occupying the most senior position of chair. The case study
evidence also suggests that management was usually the party that controls the
structure and agenda at meetings. While the election of employee representatives
could give the impression of legitimacy to decisions, in reality this must be
questioned. Third, most bodies are only given powers of recommendation to
management or the chair has the right of veto over decisions. Fourth, unlike unions,
few committees have negotiation and bargaining rights, while consultation issues
often lack financial, investment or strategic data. Finally, few of these bodies in
practice fulfil the traditional trade union activities of grievance handling and conflict
resolution, with such issues being dealt with by local managers or internal dispute
resolution mechanisms. This evidence suggests that most AFER are used as devices
for consultation and communication rather than acting as bargaining agents. While it
can be argued that consultation, not bargaining, may indeed be their objective, it
nevertheless questions the legitimacy of such bodies as true alternatives to unions.
Rather, they should be seen as additional forms of employee representation in most
cases.
These points highlight an important issue for policy makers, whether in a climate of
declining union density, should countries seek to redress this decline and close the
widening representation gap through supportive union regulation and policies. Or
alternatively, if this decline is inevitable or at least if the decline is not likely to be
reversed in the short-term, is there a role for AFER in the workplace to represent and
enforce the rights of full citizenship in society, encouraged by supportive laws and
policies. As a third alternative, should both forms of employee participation be
encouraged, since they seem to perform different roles?
In conclusion, while AFER can be used as mechanisms for more effective means of
communication and consultation, the evidence suggests that their effectiveness as
bodies representing the interests of employees in filling the lack of representation is
questionable. This presents the issue of whether state-sponsored AFER with
provisions for resources and training could improve the effectiveness of AFER in
representing employees’ interests at the workplace. For as Terry (1997) notes, ‘with
no reference to the external agencies of law or trade unions for support, they are
perceived - rightly - as managerial emanations subject to managerial whim’. In a
climate of falling union density, more individualised approaches are likely to increase,
however, to suggest that there will be an inexorable shift away from more collectivist
employee relations would be to underestimate the complexity of the world of work. In
fact, both management and employees in non-union workplaces could well rediscover
that there is an important and enduring role for collective representation at the
workplace.
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